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In this paper, we study a game called “Mafia,” in which differ-
ent players have different types of information, communication and
functionality. The players communicate and function in a way that
resembles some real-life situations. We consider two types of oper-
ations. First, there are operations that follow an open democratic
discussion. Second, some subgroups of players who may have differ-
ent interests make decisions based on their own group interest. A key
ingredient here is that the identity of each subgroup is known only
to the members of that group.
In this paper, we are interested in the best strategies for the dif-
ferent groups in such scenarios and in evaluating their relative power.
The main focus of the paper is the question: How large and strong
should a subgroup be in order to dominate the game?
The concrete model studied here is based on the popular game
“Mafia.” In this game, there are three groups of players: Mafia, detec-
tives and ordinary citizens. Initially, each player is given only his/her
own identity, except the mafia, who are given the identities of all
mafia members. At each “open” round, a vote is made to determine
which player to eliminate. Additionally, there are collective decisions
made by the mafia where they decide to eliminate a citizen. Finally,
each detective accumulates data on the mafia/citizen status of play-
ers. The citizens win if they eliminate all mafia members. Otherwise,
the mafia wins.
We first find a randomized strategy that is optimal in the absence
of detectives. This leads to a stochastic asymptotic analysis where it is
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shown that the two groups have comparable probabilities of winning
exactly when the total population size is R and the mafia size is of
order
√
R.
We then show that even a single detective changes the qualitative
behavior of the game dramatically. Here, the mafia and citizens have
comparable winning probabilities only for a mafia size linear in R.
Finally, we provide a summary of simulations complementing the
theoretical results obtained in the paper.
1. Introduction.
Motivation: quantitative analysis of extensive games. In many real-life
games, different players and coalitions have different information and ac-
tions available to them. Familiar examples include: workers, managers and
stockholders of a company; students, teachers and management of a school;
soldiers, citizens and insurgents in a war; or citizens, the mafia and the police
in a certain city.
All of these games share similar features. For example, each player may
belong to one or more coalitions. A worker/manager may also be a stock-
holder. A soldier/insurgent may be a citizen of the city where fighting takes
place. And a citizen in a city may be a policeman or a mafia member.
Another common feature is that different groups make decisions in differ-
ent ways and take actions of different types. In a company, a worker may
influence the company’s future by his/her direct actions at the company,
while as a manager/shareholder, he/she may participate in various types of
votes that will determine the future of the company.
The final common feature is the existence of different ways in which dif-
ferent players accumulate information. In particular, in all of the above
examples, there is some public information that is available to all, as well
as some other types of information that are available only to specific play-
ers/coalitions.
The “Mafia” game. A popular game exhibiting these different kinds of
interactions is “Mafia,” which takes place in an imaginary city. The mafia
is trying to destroy this city. The mafia, citizens and detectives all have
different information and available actions.
In this paper, we analyze this game with a particular focus on the relative
power of the different groups. As we will see, the different players have
immensely different powers: for a large population of size R, a mafia of
order
√
R already has a reasonable chance of winning—and a larger mafia
will surely win.
Interestingly, as soon as there is one detective present, the game becomes
fair only when the mafia consists of a linear fraction of the total population.
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The fact that different kinds of information and actions yield a great
variation in relative power is clearly true in many other settings. Our inves-
tigation here is an initial step toward understanding this phenomenon. In
the concluding section, we discuss some more general insights resulting from
our analysis.
We note, in particular, that previous research on partial information and
group games is mostly concerned with general definitions and abstract re-
sults in the context of extensive games. This line of research has not resulted
in much quantitative analysis (see, e.g., [3, 4]). Here, we focus on a very re-
stricted setting, but obtain very precise results on the relative power of
different groups.
In particular, the following phenomena should be valid in further gener-
ality (see also Section 7):
• In cases where there exists a distinguished group of size M that has com-
plete information and acts at all rounds playing against a group of players
of size R −M with no prior information that acts only at a fraction α
of the rounds, it is expected that the two groups will have comparable
winning probabilities if M =Rα.
• As soon as the group of players with no prior information acquires infor-
mation at a speed comparable with the speed at which actions are taken,
for the two groups to have comparable winning probabilities, it is required
that M and R are of the same order.
Outline. The model studied in this paper is defined in Section 2. The
optimal strategies for the game without detectives are derived in Section
3. In Section 4, we use martingale arguments in order to show that in the
game without detectives, the citizens and mafia have comparable winning
probabilities when the mafia is of a size that is of order square root of
the size of the total population. In Section 5, we analyze the game with
detectives and show the dramatic effect of the information collected by the
detectives. In Section 6, we provide more refined information on the game
without detectives using simulation studies. Some general insights and future
research directions are discussed in Section 7.
2. Mafia game: definition. We study the following model of the game
“Mafia.”
2.1. The different groups.
• There are R players. Each player is a resident.
• M of the R players are mafia members. A non-mafia-member will be called
a citizen.
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• D of theR players are detectives. The sets of detectives and mafia members
are disjoint. In particular, M +D≤R. All of the detectives are citizens.
At the beginning of the game, the following information is given to each
player.
• Each player is given his/her own identity, that is, he/she is told whether
he/she is a mafia member or a citizen and whether he/she is a detective
or not.
• Each mafia member is given the identity of all other mafia members.
No other information is given.
2.2. The different rounds. The game consists of iterations of the follow-
ing three rounds until the game terminates.
Residents: Here, all of the residents pick one player to eliminate by a plu-
rality vote. Thus, each resident is supposed to choose one per-
son he/she wishes to eliminate. The person who receives the
most votes is then eliminated and his/her identity is revealed.
The vote takes place after a discussion between all residents. In
cases of a tie, the identity of the person to be eliminated is cho-
sen uniformly at random from among all players who received
the maximal number of votes.
Mafia: In this round, the mafia choose a citizen to eliminate. This de-
cision is made without any information leaking to the other
players. The only information that becomes publicly available
is the identity of the player eliminated and whether he/she was
a detective or not.
Detectives: In this round, each detective queries the mafia/citizen status of
one player. This status is then revealed only to the detective.
No public information is revealed as a result of this exchange.
Note that after round t, there are Rt = R − 2t residents. We denote by
Mt the number of mafia members after round t and by Dt the number of
detectives after round t.
2.3. Objectives: termination rules. The game has two possible outcomes:
either the mafia wins or the citizens win.
• The citizens win if all mafia members have been eliminated and there are
still citizens alive.
• The mafia wins if all citizens have been eliminated when there are still
mafia members alive.
Note that the objectives of the mafia and citizens are group objectives. Single
players do not care if they are dead or alive, as long as their group wins.
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2.4. How do groups decide? Note that in the Detectives round, each
detective makes his/her own choice. We require each detective to return
his/her choice in time polynomial in R=R0 (the initial number of players).
However, in the two other rounds, a group makes a decision. We proceed
with the formal definition of group decisions.
For the Mafia round, this is easy. Since all mafia members have exactly
the same objective and the same information, we may assume that the same
rational choice is based on the information that was revealed up to that
point. We further require that the mafia choose its victim in time polynomial
in R.
In the Residents round, the situation is more involved. In particular, our
analysis requires the following assumption.
Assumption 1. We assume that the citizens have a way of performing
the following:
1. In the analysis of the game without detectives, we assume that all res-
idents can send a message to all other residents simultaneously. If the
game has a trustable moderator, this can be achieved by the moderator
collecting messages from all residents and then displaying all messages (if
a player does not send a message, the value of her message is 0). It can
also be performed by means of a protocol where each player writes his
message on a pad and then all pads are displayed simultaneously (again,
the value of an undisplayed message is 0). Finally, this can also be im-
plemented using commitment schemes under cryptographic assumptions
[5].
2. In the analysis of the game with detectives, we need to assume that
residents can vote anonymously. Given a trusted moderator, this can
be achieved by a ballot run by the moderator. Otherwise, this can be
performed using cryptographic voting schemes [1]
3. In the analysis of the game with detectives, we need to assume that
residents can securely exchange messages (where it is only known how
many messages were sent and received by each player). Given a trusted
moderator, this can be achieved by letting him/her carry the messages.
Otherwise, this can be achieved via standard public key techniques.
2.5. Liveness: ensuring the game progresses. We need to further spec-
ify the game’s protocol to ensure the liveness property. This property is a
common requirement in distributed protocols and software reliability and
informally says that the game cannot “stall” (see, e.g., [6, 7]).
By the requirements above, each Detective and Mafia round lasts a poly-
nomial number of steps. We model the “discussion” during the Residents
round using communication rounds between the players. We assume that
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there is an order on the players and that in each communication round,
each player has an opportunity to communicate openly to everyone and also
to send private messages to other players. The length of all messages is
polynomial in R.
Under Assumption 1.2 above, we allow the players to conduct an anony-
mous vote in one communication round. Note that the anonymous vote is
not binding by itself and that, ultimately, the player to be eliminated at the
end of the round is determined in an open plurality vote.
We further require each Residents round to last a polynomial number of
steps. In other words, there is a c such that for each Residents round, a vote
is performed after p(R) =O(Rc) communication rounds between the players.
After p(R) rounds, each player is required to vote openly in a predetermined
order on the next player to be eliminated. We further bound the amount of
computational steps each player can undertake between the communication
rounds by O(Rc).
The conditions above ensure that each Residents round takes at most
O(R2c) steps and that the entire game terminates in polynomial time. In
practice, the protocols analyzed here satisfy the requirement above as they
only require a constant number of communication rounds with a linear
amount of computation (with an overhead added depending on the cryp-
tographic protocols used). The protocols rely on analyzing and controlling
the flow of information, rather than on complicated communication schemes.
3. The game without detectives: optimal strategies. In this section, we
demonstrate that the game without detectives has a simple optimal strategy
for both sides.
3.1. Citizens’ optimal strategy. The citizens’ strategy is designed in such
away that if all citizens follow it then they have a high probability of winning
the game. More specifically, this strategy guarantees that a random player
will be eliminated as long as there is a majority of citizens. The strategy is
defined as follows.
• On day t, each resident 1≤ s≤ Rt picks a random integer n(s) between
0 and Rt − 1. The residents announce their number simultaneously. Re-
call that the residents can announce their numbers simultaneously by
Assumption 1.
• Let n= 1+ (∑n(s)modRt). All residents are supposed to vote to elimi-
nate player number n.
3.2. Properties of citizens’ strategy. Note that following this strategy
will result in eliminating a random player as long as the citizens form a
majority. This follows since the number n has the uniform distribution as
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long as there is at least one citizen and since, when there is a majority of
citizens, the vote will result in the elimination of player number n.
Note, furthermore, that the above protocol relies on the assumption that
the players can announce their numbers at the same time before they may
observe other players’ announced numbers since, otherwise, the mafia may
vote for a number such that the sum corresponds to a citizen.
Claim 1. The strategy above is optimal for the citizens.
This claim follows since, for every possible strategy for the citizens, all
mafia members may follow this strategy, pretending to be citizens, until the
mafia has achieved a majority. Note that by doing so, in each Residents
round, a random resident will be eliminated, as in the strategy above. Once
the mafia has achieved a majority, it will win, regardless of the citizens’
strategy.
3.3. Mafia’s optimal response.
Claim 2. Any strategy for the mafia where all mafia vote to eliminate
resident number n that has been selected during the Residents round is an
optimal response to the citizens’ strategy.
The second claim follows since as long as the citizens have the majority,
the actions of the mafia are irrelevant. Moreover, once the mafia have a
majority and they eliminate a citizen at each round, the mafia will win the
game.
4. The game without detectives: stochastic analysis. Given the optimal
strategies described above, the analysis of the game with detectives reduces
to the analysis of the following stochastic process. Suppose that after round
t, there are Rt residents, of which Mt are mafia members. Note that at the
Residents round, a mafia member is eliminated with probability Mt/Rt and
that at the Mafia round, no mafia members are eliminated.
Definition 1. Let w(R,M) denote the probability that the mafia wins
the game without detectives when initially there are M mafia members
among the R residents and the citizens play according to their optimal
strategy.
The following theorem roughly states that when there are no detectives,
the mafia and citizens have comparable chances to win when the mafia size
M is of order
√
R. Moreover, ifM is a large multiple of
√
R, then the chance
that the mafia wins is close to 1 and if it is a small multiple of
√
R, then
the chance that the mafia wins is close to 0.
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Theorem 1. There exists functions p : (0,∞)→ (0,1) and q : (0,∞)→
(0,1) such that if 0< η <∞, the number of residents R is sufficiently large
and the mafia size satisfies M ∈ [η√R,η√R+1], then
p(η)≤w(R,M)≤ q(η).
Furthermore,
lim
η→∞
p(η) = 1
and
lim
η→0
q(η) = 0.
We prove the two parts of Theorem 1 in Claim 3 and Claim 4 below.
Claim 3. For every constant η > 0, there exists a constant q(η)< 1 such
that for large enough n, when the Mafia has M ≤ η√R members, the Mafia
will win with probability at most q(η). Moreover, we have limη→0 q(η) = 0.
Proof. Let Rt andMt denote the numbers of residents and mafia mem-
bers, respectively, at the beginning of day t. The sequence Xt =Mt(Mt −
1)/Rt is a martingale:
E[Xt+1|Xt,Xt−1, . . . ,X0]
=
Mt
Rt
· (Mt − 1)(Mt − 2)
Rt − 2 +
Rt −Mt
Rt
· Mt(Mt − 1)
Rt − 2 =Xt.
We stop the martingale at the stopping time T when either:
• there is at most one mafia member or at most one citizen, or
• the number of residents is less than or equal to n + 1 for n = n(η) =
⌈4 + 8η2⌉.
By the martingale stopping time theorem (e.g., see [2]), we have
E[XT ] =E[X0] =
M(M − 1)
R
≤ η2.
We now consider two cases.
• The case where MT <RT /2. Note that in this case, either RT = n,n+ 1
or MT ≤ 1 and RT > n+1. In the first case, we can bound the probability
that the citizens win from below by the probability that at all Residents
rounds, a mafia member is eliminated, which is bounded below by(
1
n+1
)n/2+1
.
It is easy to see that the probability that the citizens win in the second
case is at least 1/(n+ 1).
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• The case where MT ≥RT /2. Note that if this is the case, then
XT ≥ (MT − 1)/2> n/4− 1.
However,
P [XT ≥ n/4− 1]≤ E[XT ]
n/4− 1 ≤
η2
n/4− 1 .
Thus, P [XT ≥ n/4− 1]≤ 1/2 if n≥ 4 + 8η2.
This proves that for every η > 0, the probability that the citizens win is
at least
1
2
(
1
n+ 1
)n/2+1
,
proving that q(η)< 1 for all η.
Next, we want to show that if η is sufficiently small, then q(η) is close to
0. To achieve this, let ǫ > 0. Now, repeat the argument above where:
• We first choose n= n(ǫ) large enough so that if MT ≤ 1 and RT ≥ n, then
the mafia wins with probability at most ǫ/2. This can be done since the
probability that a single mafia member will win when there are n residents
is at most
g(n) =
(
1− 1
n
)(
1− 1
n− 2
)
≤ · · · ≤
(
n
n+1
n− 1
n
· · ·
)1/2
≤
(
2
n+ 1
)1/2
.
Thus, it suffices to take n+1 = 8/ǫ2.
• We now repeat the argument above, considering the following two cases:
MT ≤ 1;
MT ≥ 2.
In the first case, the mafia will win with probability at most ǫ/2. In the
second case, if MT ≥ 2, then XT ≥ 2/(n+1). On the other hand,
P [XT ≥ 2/(n+1)]≤ (n+1)η2/2.
Thus, if η ≤ min(2/(n + 1), ǫ/2), then we obtain that the second case
occurs with probability at most ǫ/2.
We have thus shown that if η is sufficiently small, then the probability that
the mafia wins is at most ǫ, proving that limη→0 q(η) = 0. The quantitative
estimates we obtain here show that it suffices to take η ≤ ǫ2/8 in order to
ensure that the mafia wins with probability at most ǫ. 
Claim 4. For every constant η > 0, there exists a constant p(η)> 0 such
that for large enough R, when the Mafia has M ≥ η√R members, the Mafia
wins with probability at least p(η). Moreover, limη→∞ p(η) = 1.
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Proof. Consider the sequence
Yt = Y (Rt,Mt) :=
M2t (Mt − 1)2
R2t −RtMt + cM2t (Mt − 1)2
,
where c > 0 is an appropriately chosen small constant. For example, one can
take c= 1/100.
Claim 5. There exists a k > 0 such that whenever k ≤Mt <Rt/2, then
Yt is a submartingale, that is,
E[Yt+1|Yt, Yt−1, . . . , Y0,Mt ≥ k]≥ Yt.
Proof. Given Mt =M ≥ 2 and Rt =R≥ 1, it holds that
E[Yt+1|Mt =M,Rt =R]
=E[Y (Rt+1,Mt+1)|Mt =M,Rt =R]
=
M
R
· Y (R− 2,M − 1) + R−M
R
· Y (R− 2,M).
We claim that this quantity is greater than Y (R,M). Denote the denom-
inator of Y (R,M) by D(R,M) = R2 − RM + c(M − 1)2M2. Note that if
R≥M > 0, thenD(R,M) is positive. Using Mathematica, one obtains (with
c= 1/100) that
E[Yt+1|(Rt,Mt) = (R,M)]− Y (R,M)
is given by
P (R,M)/100
R ·D(R,M) ·D(R− 2,M) ·D(R− 2,M − 1) ,
where
P (R,M) = 1600R2M − 1600R3M +400R4M − 2416RM2 − 384R2M2
+2400R3M2 − 800R4M2 + 16M3 +4456RM3 − 4076R2M3
+100R3M3 + 400R4M3 − 72M4 − 1448RM4 +2844R2M4
− 1000R3M4 + 122M5 − 847RM5 +64R2M5 + 100R3M5
− 88M6 + 308RM6 − 36R2M6 +12M7 − 66RM7−12R2M7
+16M8 + 12RM8 − 6M9 +RM9.
We need to show that for sufficiently large k, P (R,M) is always positive.
For sufficiently large M and R, the highlighted terms of P (R,M) dominate
its behavior in the following sense. For each highlighted term, all of the
monomials preceding it have both their R andM
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the highlighted term and at least one of them is strictly smaller. In particular,
for R≥M ≥ k, for sufficiently large k, it holds that
P (R,M)> 300R4M3 +99R3M5 − 13R2M7 + 910RM9
> 81R3M5 − 16R2M7 + 6481RM9 =RM5 · (9R− 89M2)2 ≥ 0. 
We now return to the proof of Claim 4. We stop Y at the first time T
where either:
• at least half of the remaining residents are Mafia members, or
• Mt ≤ k.
We have
E[YT ]≥ E[Y0] = M
2(M − 1)2
R2 −RM + cM2(M − 1)2
≥ 1
R2/(M2(M − 1)2) + c
≥ 1
2/η2 + c
=
1
c
− 2
c(2 + cη2)
:= h(η).
Observe that we always have 0≤ YT < 1/c. Moreover, if MT ≤ k, then
YT <
k4
RT (RT −MT ) <
k4
RT
.
Letting
A1 =
[
MT = k and RT >
2k4
h(η)
]
,
we have
h(η) ≤E[YT ]<P [A1] · k
4
RT
+ (1− p[A1]) · 1
c
<
h(η)
2
+ (1− p[A1]) · 1
c
.
Hence,
1− p[A1]≥ c · h(η)
2
.
Thus, with probability at least ch(η)2 , either:
• at least half of the remaining residents are Mafia members, in which case
the Mafia wins; or
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• MT = k and RT ≤ 2k2h(η) . The quantities here depend on η, but not on R0,
and the Mafia has a positive probability s(η) > 0 of winning with these
initial conditions.
Finally, we obtain
p(η)≥ (1−P [A1]) · s(η)≥ c · h(η)s(η)
2
> 0.
In order to conclude the proof, we would like to show now that p(η)→ 1
as η→∞. Let A2 be the event that MT = k. Then, on the complement of
A2, the Mafia wins. Therefore, it suffices to show that P [A2]→ 0 as η→∞.
If MT = k, then RT ≥ 2MT = 2k and therefore
YT <
k2(k− 1)2
k2 + ck2(k− 1)2 =
1
c
− d(k)
for some positive d(k). We now conclude that
h(η)≤E[YT ]<P [A2]
(
1
c
− d(k)
)
+ (1− P [A2])1
c
.
Since h(η)→ 1c as η→∞, it follows that P [A2]→ 0, and therefore p(η) ≥
1− P [A2]→ 1. 
5. The game with detectives.
5.1. Results. In this section, we investigate the power of the detectives.
We show that even a single detective suffices to change the qualitative be-
havior of the game. More formally we prove the following.
Theorem 2.
• Consider the game with one detective and mafia of size M = ηR <R/49.
Then, for R sufficiently large, the probability that the mafia wins, denoted
w(R,M,1), satisfies p(η,1) ≤ w(R,M,1) ≤ q(η,1), where 0 < p(η,1) <
q(η,1)< 1 for all η < 1/49 and q(η,1)→ 0 as η→ 0.
• Let d≥ 1 and consider the game with d detectives and mafia of size M =
ηR, where η < 1/2. Then, for R sufficiently large, the probability that the
mafia wins, denoted w(R,M,d), satisfies w(R,M,d)≤ q(η, d), where, for
each η < 1/2, it holds that limd→∞ q(η, d) = 0.
The theorem implies that even a single detective dramatically changes
the citizens’ team power: while in the game with no detectives, a mafia of
size R1/2+ǫ will surely win, as soon as there is one detective, the mafia will
lose unless it is of size Ω(R).
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The rest of the section is dedicated to proving Theorem 2. In Section 5.2,
we find a strategy for citizens that shows the existence of q(η,1) < 1, such
that q(η,1)→ 0 as η→ 0. This will be proven in Claim 9. In Section 5.4, we
find a strategy for the mafia that shows the existence of p(η,1) > 0 for all
η < 1/2. In fact, Claim 10 shows that such a strategy exists for any number
of detectives. Finally, in Section 5.5, Claim 11, we prove the second part of
the theorem.
5.2. The citizens’ strategy. The key to the citizens’ strategy is using the
information gathered by the detective in an optimal way. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, it turns out that the crucial information collected by the detective is
not the identity of mafia members, but the identity of citizens. Note that
the “natural” life expectancy of the detective is about R/4, in which time
he/she will have a chance to collect information about roughly half of the
Mafia members (the life expectancy is, in fact, smaller since citizens die
faster than mafia). Even assuming that this half of the Mafia is eliminated,
the remaining citizens will have to deal with the second half after the detec-
tive is gone. From previous sections, we know that this is impossible if the
mafia size is R1/2+ǫ for ǫ > 0.
Instead, what is crucial is to use the information collected by the detective
in order to notify citizens about the identity of other citizens. In this way, the
citizens can collaborate after the detective has been eliminated in order to
control the Residents rounds in a way similar to the way the mafia controls
the Mafia rounds.
The citizens’ strategy is divided into two stages. The first stage is before
the detective dies and the second is after. Note that the death of the detective
confirms his/her identity. The citizens strategy is as follows.
• Stage 1: the detective is still alive. This lasts for √ηR rounds, or until the
detective is eliminated.
– The detective collects information about people at random.
– The other citizens, during the day phase, vote at random to eliminate
a person, as in the case with no detectives.
• Stage 2: the transition. If the detective does not survive to this stage, the
citizens forfeit. In other words, if the detective dies before round
√
ηR,
the citizens give up. Otherwise, the detective compiles an ordered list of
people V (vigilantes) that he/she knows are citizens. He/she then encrypts
and sends the list to each member of V . At this stage, we are supposed
to have |V |> |M |.
The detective then asks everyone to eliminate him/her (during the day
phase). Once the detective is eliminated (and thus the members of V learn
that the messages they have received are genuine), the third stage of the
game begins.
14 M. BRAVERMAN, O. ETESAMI AND E. MOSSEL
In the case where multiple people claim to be detectives, they will all be
eliminated according to the order in which they made their declarations
(this guarantees that no mafia members will want to declare that they are
detectives).
• Stage 3: the detective is dead. This lasts until the Mafia is eliminated, or
until |V | ≤ |M |, in which case the citizens forfeit. During every day round,
the next person p to be eliminated is selected using a secure anonymous
vote and then everyone (at least the citizens) vote to eliminate p.
– Members of V : The highest ranking surviving member of V randomly
selects a person from outside V and sends his number k to all other
members of V . The members of V then all vote for k in the secret vote.
– Other citizens: All other citizens abstain in the secret vote.
5.3. Stochastic analysis of the citizens’ strategy.
Claim 6. The probability that the detective survives until the second
stage is at least 1− p1(η), where
p1(η) =
2
√
η
1− η <
1
3
and p1(η)→ 0 as η→ 0.
Proof. During the first stage of the strategy, the detective is indistin-
guishable from the rest of the citizens and his/her chance of being eliminated
before making
√
ηR queries is bounded by p1(η) =
2
√
η
1−η <
1
3 . It is obvious that
p1(η)→ 0 as η→ 0. 
Claim 7. With probability at least 1− p1(η)− p2(η), the detective sur-
vives until stage 2 and queries at least v(η) of the citizens alive up to stage
2, where:
• p2(η)≤ 2/3 for all η < 1/49 and p2(η)→ 0 as η→ 0;
• the function v(η) satisfies
v(η)≥ 52ηR= 52M(1)
for all η < 1/49 and
v(η)≥√ηR/2 = M
2
√
η
(2)
for small values of η.
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Proof. In order to prove the claim, we will assume that the detective
writes down the indices of the people he/she is going to query ahead of
time. During rounds when he/she is supposed to query the identity of a
dead resident, he/she will not query at all. Let v(η) denote the number of
citizens queried from the list that are alive by stage 2. Then, in order to
prove the claim, it suffices to show that, with probability 1− p2(η), at least
v(η) of the citizens alive are stage 2 are on the list of queried residents.
Note that there are at least (
√
η− η)R and at most √ηR citizens on the
detective’s list. At most 2
√
ηR out of (1− η)R citizens are eliminated. The
set of those eliminated is chosen independently of the ones to be queried.
Hence, the expected number of citizens that have been eliminated and also
on the querying list is bounded by(
2
√
η
1− η
)√
ηR=
2η
1− ηR≤
7
3
ηR.(3)
The last inequality holds for η ≤ 1/7. Hence, with probability ≥ 1/3, at most
(7/2)ηR citizens on the list are eliminated, which means that at least
V ≥ (√η− 92η)R≥ 52ηR
survive to be in V . The last inequality assumes that η < 1/49. Together, we
obtain that, with probability at least 1/3− p1(η)> 0, the game survives to
the second stage and v(η)≥ 52M .
For a small η, using (3), the probability that at least (
√
η/2− η)R of the
citizens on the list are eliminated is bounded by
p2(η) =
7/3η√
η/2− η → 0
as η→ 0. Hence, with probability at least 1− p2(η), we have
v(η)≥ (√η− η)R− (√η/2− η)R=√η/2.
Thus, with probability at least 1 − p1(η) − p2(η)→ 1 as η→ 0, the game
survives to the second stage and v(η)≥M/(2√η). 
Claim 8. Consider stage 3 of the game with |V | ≥ v(η). Then, for all
η < 1/49, the probability that the citizens lose is at most p3(η), where p3(η)≤
4/5 and p3(η)→ 0 as η→ 0.
Proof. We define the time when the third stage begins as t= 0. Con-
sider the quantity
Zt = Z(Vt,Mt) =
Mt
Vt +1
.
Define a stopping time T to be the first time when either:
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• VT ≤MT , in which case the citizens lose;
• there are no citizens outside V remaining alive, in which case the citizens
win if VT >MT ;
• the mafia is eliminated, in which case the citizens win.
Denote by Ut the citizens who are not members of V . Thus, during the course
of the second stage, we have Ut > 0, Mt > 0 and Vt >Mt. We verify that
under these conditions, Zt is a supermartingale. For any Vt,Mt,Ut satisfying
the conditions, we have
E[Zt+1|Vt,Mt,Ut]−Z(Vt,Mt)
=
Mt
Ut +Mt
· Vt
Ut + Vt
Z(Vt − 1,Mt − 1)
+
Mt
Ut +Mt
· Ut
Ut + Vt
Z(Vt,Mt − 1)
+
Ut
Ut +Mt
· Vt
Ut + Vt − 1Z(Vt − 1,Mt)
+
Ut
Ut +Mt
· Ut − 1
Ut + Vt − 1Z(Vt,Mt)−Z(Vt,Mt)
=
Mt((Mt − Vt)(Ut + Vt) + 1−Mt)
(Ut +Mt)(Vt +1)(Ut + Vt)(Ut + Vt − 1) ≤ 0.
The last inequality holds by our assumptions in the definition of the stopping
time. Thus,
E[ZT ]≤ Z0.
Observe that if the citizens lose, then ZT ≥ 1/2. In either case, ZT ≥ 0.
Hence,
P [citizens lose]≤ E[ZT ]
1/2
≤ 2Z0.
In particular, we have the following.
• By (1), we have V0 ≥ 52M0 for all η < 1/49 and therefore
P [citizens lose]≤ 2Z0 < 2 · 25 = 45 .
Hence, p3(η)≤ 45 for all η < 1/49.
• By (2), for small η, we have V0 ≥M/(2√η) and therefore
P [citizens lose]≤ 2Z0 < 2 · 2√η = 4√η→ 0 as η→ 0.
Thus, p3(η,1)→ 0 as η→ 0.
MAFIA 17

Since q(η,1)≥ (1−p1(η)−p2(η))(1−p3(η)), Claim 6, Claim 7 and Claim 8
imply the following.
Claim 9. The strategy defined in Section 5.2 satisfies q(η,1)< 1 for all
η < 1/49 and q(η,1)→ 0 as η→ 0.
5.4. The Mafia’s strategy.
Claim 10. In the game with d detectives and mafia of size ηR for large
R, the probability that the mafia wins is at least η
2
72 (
η
8d )
d.
Proof. The mafia’s strategy will be to eliminate random citizens. With
probability at least (η/8d)d, all of the detectives are dead by time t0 =
η
4dR.
Moreover, by time t0, there are at least 3ηR/4 mafia members that are alive
and whose identity was not queried by any of the detectives. Finally, by time
t0, the detectives have queried the identity of at most ηR/4 of the citizens.
The proof would follow if we could show that, given the scenario with
a mafia of size at least 3ηR/4, the number of citizens whose identity was
queried at most ηR/4 and no detectives, the probability that the mafia wins
is at least η2/72. Let V denote the set of citizens whose identities were
queried and who are alive at time t0. Let S denote the mafia members alive
at time t0 and let W denote the remaining citizens.
We first note that during the Residents rounds, the probability that a
mafia member is eliminated is the same as the probability that a citizen
whose identity has not been queried is eliminated. In other words, no matter
what strategy the citizens choose, they cannot do better than eliminating
at random one of the residents alive in the set S ∪W .
Let S = S1∪S2, where the sets S1 and S2 are disjoint and |S1|= |V |. Note
that |S2| ≥ ηR/2. Consider the following suboptimal strategy of the mafia
where, during the night, they eliminate uniformly a member of V ∪W ∪S2.
Let T be the first round where all member of S1 or all members of V
have been eliminated. Then, by symmetry, it follows that, with probability
at least 1/2, all of the citizens in V have been eliminated at time T .
LetW (T ) denote the number of citizens alive at time T . Let S2(T ) denote
the number of S2 alive at time T . If W (T ) = 0, then the mafia clearly wins.
Otherwise, by conditioning on the value of x=W (T ) + S2(T ), we obtain
E[S2(T )|W (T ) + S2(T ) = x]≥ η/2
1 + η/2
x=
η
2 + η
x >
η
3
x,
hence
E
[
S2(T )
W (T ) + S2(T )
∣∣∣W (T ) + S2(T )> 0
]
>
η
3
.
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Therefore,
P
[
S2(T )≥max
(
1,
η
6
W (T )
)]
≥ η
6
.
Since the probability that a mafia of size max(1, ηw/6), wins against w
citizens is at least η/6 the proof follows. 
5.5. Many detectives. We now prove the second part of Theorem 2.
Claim 11. Consider the game with a mafia of size η = (1/2− δ)R. Let
d be an integer greater than 4/δ + 1. Then, given that there are at least d2
detectives, the probability that the citizens win is at least 1− de−d.
Proof. The strategy of the citizens and detectives is defined as follows.
Before the game, the residents are partitioned into d sets of size at most
⌊ δ4R⌋.
Each detective queries the identity of all players in a randomly chosen
set. If the detective succeeds to query all identities, then he/she reveals all
mafia members in that set. The detective is then eliminated in order to verify
his/her claims.
If the identity of all mafia members has been revealed (by round δ4R), the
citizens will win by eliminating one mafia member at each round since they
are still a majority at round δ4R.
Note that a specific detective will not query the identity of one of the
d groups if either the detective is eliminated by the mafia or the detective
picked a different group. Since the two events are independent, the proba-
bility that a specific group is queried by a specific detective is at least
1
d
P [the detective survives]≥ 1
d
(
1− (δ/2)R
R− ηR
)
>
1
d
(
1− (δ/2)R
R/2
)
>
1
2d
≥ δ.
This is also true conditioning on the status of all other detectives. Therefore,
the probability that the status of the mafia members in the set is not queried
is at most
(1− δ)d2 ≤ (1− 2/d)d2 ≤ exp(−d).
Therefore, the probability that all mafia members are queried is at least
1− de−d. The proof follows. 
Remark 1. It is an interesting problem to study the optimal querying
procedure as a function of the number of detectives d and the mafia size ηR.
In particular, some alternatives to the strategy suggested here include:
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• the detectives will query identities at random;
• the detectives will query according to some combinatorial design.
We believe that for a small mafia size ηR and a small number of detectives,
querying at random results in high winning probabilities. For high values of
η and d, it seems like that combinatorial designs should work better.
5.6. A strategy for citizens with no cryptographic assumptions. In this
section, we briefly outline a strategy for citizens with at least one detective
without making any cryptographic assumptions. The strategy gives the citi-
zens a positive probability p(η, d)> 0 of winning against a mafia of size ηR.
Unlike the previous strategies, the present strategy makes no assumptions
concerning private communication or other cryptographic protocols.
In this strategy, the detective collects information until time T , when
he/she knows the identities of more than half of the residents alive to be
good citizens. After that, the detective publishes a list VT of the good cit-
izens he/she knows and is then eliminated to verify the claim. Under our
assumption, |VT |>RT /2.
The citizens in VT then attempt during the day rounds to eliminate every-
one not in VT . Since VT are a majority, they will succeed and after RT −|VT |
rounds, only members of VT will remain alive and the citizens will win.
It remains to bound from below the probability that the detective will
succeed without getting eliminated. The detective will make the queries
independently at random.
Claim 12. Assuming that η < 1/72, a detective has a probability of at
least p(η,1)> 1/108 to identify a set VT as above without being eliminated.
Proof. With probability at least 1/12, the detective survives until the
round when there are less than L = R/9 residents remaining. For a given
surviving resident, his chance of not being queried in any round is at most(
1− 1
R
)(
1− 1
R− 2
)
· · ·
(
1− 1
L
)
< e−1/Re−1/(R−2) · · ·e−1/L < e−(lnR−lnL)/2 =
√
L
R
<
√
1
9
=
1
3
.
Hence, we expect at least 23L of the residents to have been queried. This
means that, with probability at least 19 , at least
5
8L residents have been
queried. Since at most R/72 = L/8 of the residents can be mafia, we conclude
that in this case, at least half of all residents have been identified as citizens.

We conclude with the following observations.
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• As the number of detectives grows, so do the chances of the above strat-
egy to succeed. In particular, for any ε > 0, there exists a d such that d
detectives have a winning probability of at least 1− ε against a mafia of
size (1/2− ε)R.
• Unlike the strategy in Section 5.2, there is no guarantee that p(η, d)→ 1
as η → 0. In fact, a mafia of size Ω(√n) has a positive probability of
winning—by eliminating the detectives before they have a chance to reveal
information.
6. Simulation studies. In this section, we briefly discuss some simula-
tions complementing the theoretical picture we have derived so far. All of
the experiments deal with the case of no detectives, for which we know the
optimal strategies of both the mafia and the citizens.
In Figure 1(a), we calculate the winning probability of a mafia of size
M = η
√
R as a function of η. The figure was derived by repeating the game
10,000 times with R= 10,000. In Figure 1(b), we zoom in to Figure 1(a) for
η ≤ 0.4 and simulating the game 20,000 times. Note that for such values, the
function is almost linear.
In Figure 2, we estimate the size of the M(R) such that the probability
that the mafia wins is exactly 1/2. This is done by running the game 2,000
times with different sizes of M and R. Note the excellent fit of this function
with a function of the type M = c
√
R.
In Figure 3, we run three simulations of the game with R= 106 and M =
103 (so η = 1). Each row in the figure corresponds to one run. In each of the
three drawings, we plot the value of the martingale X(t) =Mt · (Mt− 1)/Rt
as a function of the round t. In the first column we draw this function for all
500,000 steps, in the second for the last 10,000 and in the last for the last
100.
Fig. 1. (a) The winning probability for mafia of size M = η
√
R as a function of η; (b)
The same winning probabilities for η ≤ 0.4—the linear approximation of the probability is
shown.
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Fig. 2. The size M(R) for which the probability of the mafia to win is about 1/2.
Fig. 3. Three runs of the game where the function X(t) of round t is
X(t) =Mt · (Mt − 1)/Rt. The value of X(t) is drawn for t ≤ 500,000. The second and
third columns zoom in on the last 10,000 and 100 rounds, respectively.
From the figure, one sees that the function η(t) is mostly “deterministic”
at the beginning of the game and becomes “random” only at the game’s
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end. While we have not stated such results formally, this can be shown
using standard concentration results.
7. Discussion and open problems. Our results exhibit interesting trade-
offs in a group game between information, actions and sizes of groups. They
also raise questions about the significance of secure protocols in such games.
We believe that these problems should be further investigated. In particular:
• In the mafia game without detectives, the mafia acted at all rounds, while
the citizens acted at only half of the rounds.
Conjecture 1. Consider a variant of the mafia game without detec-
tives, where each r rounds are partitioned into d day rounds and n= r−d
night rounds. The two groups then have comparable winning probabilities
if M =Rd/r.
Note that our results correspond to the special case where r = 2, d= 1.
In fact, one would expect such a phenomenon to be more general. It
should hold when a group with complete information plays against a group
where each individual has very little information and where the partial
information group takes action at d/r of the rounds.
• Our results show that once the partial information group can collect in-
formation at a linear speed, it stands a chance against even a complete
information group of comparable size. It is interesting to study how gen-
eral this phenomenon is.
• It would be interesting to see whether the strategy from Section 5.6 can be
improved to guarantee success against a sublinear mafia with probability
tending to 1 (as is the case with the cryptographic assumptions). If there
is no such strategy, proving that this is the case appears to be very hard
without putting strict restrictions on the type of messages allowed to be
passed.
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